Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
From dKosopedia
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment has often been interpreted to include two freedoms: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act. The former liberty is absolute, while the latter often faces state restriction. Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious group, was often the target of such restriction. Several cases involving the Jehovah's Witnesses permitted the Supreme Court to expound the free exercise clause. The Warren Court adopted an wider view of the clause, the "compelling interest" doctrine (whereby a state must show a compelling interest in restricting religion-related activities), but later decisions have reduced the scope of this interpretation.
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Jehovah's Witnesses cases
During the twentieth century, many major cases involving the free exercise clause related to Jehovah's Witnesses. Many communities directed laws against the Witnesses and their attempts to convert individuals to their religion. From 1938 to 1955, the organization was involved in over forty cases before the Supreme Court, winning a majority of them. The first important victory came in 1938, when in Lovell v. City of Griffin, the Supreme Court held that cities could not require permits for the distribution of pamphlets. In 1939, the Supreme Court decided Schneider v. Town of Irvington, in which it struck down anti-littering laws that were enforced only against Jehovah's Witnesses who were handing out pamphlets. In 1940, the Court considered Cantwell v. Connecticut; the plaintiff, a Jehovah's Witness, was charged with soliciting donations without a certificate from the Public Welfare Council. The Council was to grant the certificate only if the organization requesting it was a charity or sponsored a religious cause. The Supreme Court ruled that any law granting a public body the function of determining if a cause is religious or not violates the First Amendment.
The year 1940, however, was also marked by a loss for the Jehovah's Witnesses, in the case of Minersville School District v. Gobitis (the latter name was actually "Gobitas," but was misspelled by a clerk). The Minersville School Board had contended that the refusal of Gobitas' children to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance constituted insubordination, and then expelled them. Gobitas charged that his children's faith required them to salute none but God. Two courts ruled against the School Board after Gobitas sued, but the Supreme Court disagreed in an eight to one vote. Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote that religion "does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities." He added that the flag "is the symbol of our national unity, transcending all internal differences."
The ruling in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, however, did not stand for long. In 1943, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Supreme Court essentially reversed its previous opinion. Justice Frankfurter had, in the Gobitis case, suggested that the Witnesses attempt to reverse the School Board's policy by exercising their vote. In the Barnette case, however, Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote, "the very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities ... One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote." The Supreme Court did not rule that the Pledge was unconstitutional; rather, they held that students may not be compelled to recite it.
Compelling interest
The Supreme Court under Earl Warren adopted an expansive view of the free exercise clause. The Court required that states have a "compelling interest" in refusing to accommodate religiously motivated conduct as it decided Sherbert v. Verner in 1963. The case involved Adele Sherbert, an individual who was denied unemployment benefits by South Carolina because she refused to work on Saturdays as required by her Seventh Day Adventist faith. In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), the Court ruled that a law that "unduly burdens the practice of religion" without a compelling interest, even though it might be "neutral on its face," would be unconstitutional.
The "compelling interest" doctrine became much narrower in 1990, when the Supreme Court held in Oregon Employment Division v. Smith that, as long as a law does not target a particular religious practice, it is constitutional insofar as the free exercise clause is concerned. In 1993, the Supreme Court revisited the free exercise clause when it decided Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah. Hialeah had passed an ordinance banning ritual slaughter, a practice central to the Santería religion, while providing exceptions for some practices such as the kosher slaughter of Judaism. Since the ordinance was not "generally applicable," the Court ruled that it was subject to the compelling interest test, which it failed to meet. The Court therefore struck down the City's ordinance.
Also in 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which sought to restore the "compelling interest" standard. In City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), however, the Court struck down the provisions of the Act which forced states and local governments to provide more protections than required by the First Amendment. The Act, however, remains applicable to the federal government, which must therefore still meet the "compelling interest" standard in free exercise cases.
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